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Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition. By E. Christian Brugger. Notre 




 Has the Roman Catholic Church changed its mind on the death penalty? Brugger, assistant 
professor of ethics at Loyola University of New Or- leans, contends that it has. He begins by 
analyzing pertinent sections of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997) and of Pope John 
Paul IFs encyclical letters, Evangelium Vitae (1995) and Veritatis Splendor (1993). From these 
documents, he infers that the 1997 Catechism, in sharp contrast to the 1566 Roman Catechism, 
teaches that capital punishment is not an exception to the fifth commandment, "You shall not 
kill." Whereas the sixteenth-century Catechism taught that the death penalty could be inflicted in 
order to redress wrongdoing (retributive justice), the new Catechism, supported by the two 
encyclical letters, eliminates retribution as a justification for the death penalty and limits state 
execution to instances where it is absolutely necessary to protect the community's safety. Such 
instances, the Catechism asserts, "are very rare, if not practically non-existent" (§2267). Brugger 
argues that the dignity of the human person provides the anthropological basis for suppressing 
retribution as a justification for capital punishment.  
 To support his contention that the magisterium has developed its teaching in opposition to 
capital punishment, the author examines certain texts in both the Old and the New Testaments. 
He gives central focus to Paul's Letter to the Romans (13:1-7)—especially to the verse, "for the 
authority does not bear the sword in vain" (13:4b)—arguing correctly that most contemporary 
biblical scholars interpret the meaning of "sword" as a metaphor for the state's coercive authority 
and not specifically for capital punishment. His historical analysis includes a clear interpretation 
of influential Christian thinkers (Augustine, Pope Innocent III, and Thomas Aquinas), as well as 
important texts (Gratian's Decretals [c. 1140], papal writings). Brugger's interpretations of both 
Scripture and tradition are objective and insightful. His survey reveals a gradual increase in 
Christian participation in exacting the death penalty, moving from no Christian participation (pre-
Constantinian period), to lay Christian participation (post-Constantinian period), to participation 
by both clergy and laity (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). 
 Brugger shows how many arguments coalesce into one doctrine aimed at justifying capital 
punishment, based principally on theories of retribution and community safety. Moreover, he 
demonstrates in great detail that the doctrine was never infallibly taught and calls it "non-
irreformable" teaching. He concludes by stating his normative position that "[society's] refraining 
from deliberately killing serious offenders is an expression of commitment to the fundamental 
dignity of the human person." 
 He systematizes his position in the final chapter by entering into a creative dialogue with 
Thomas Aquinas, whose defense of capital punishment has carried the most authority in the 
Catholic tradition. Brugger offers an excellent critique of Aquinas's arguments. Aquinas, for 
example, reasons that by sinning (committing murder) a person departs from the order of reason 
and thereby falls away from human dignity. Hence, the judge may justifiably condemn this 
individual sinner to death, not out of hatred, but out of charity for the community. Brugger gently 
probes Aquinas's understanding of "human nature," pointing out that Aquinas elsewhere claims 
that rational human nature and being loved by God confer dignity on a person. Brugger rightly 
points out that, since neither of these gifts is lost because of sin, human beings do not lose their 
inherent dignity by committing a crime. Therefore, murderers should not be treated as beasts that 
can be sacrificed without remorse, as Aquinas argues. 
Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition is highly recommended for those who 
want to delve into arguments underlying the Roman Catholic Church's shift on this issue. Because 
of its careful textual analysis of Scripture, church documents, and theological arguments, this 
book is not an easy read. Critics may challenge Brugger's contention that the 1997 Catechism, 
while not explicitly stating that capital punishment is intrinsically wrong, nonetheless presents 
premises that imply this. Brugger ends by venturing beyond capital punishment to argue that 
killing in war must be based on a paradigm of self-defense. Faithful to his principle that we 
should not intentionally kill human beings, he argues that measures of violence "must not include 
at any level the deaths per se of the enemy." Yet fighting defensively in war without directly 
intending the death of the attacking enemy seems unreal. Perhaps the author may address in his 
next volume how his principle of excluding intentional harm to humans modifies some of the 
principles of the just war. 
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